Title
Trust No One: Thwarting "heartbleed" Attacks Using Privacy-Preserving Computation
Abstract
A security bug in the OpenSSL library, codenamed Heartbleed, allowed attackers to read the contents of the corresponding server's memory, effectively revealing passwords, master keys, and users' session cookies. As long as the server memory contents are in the clear, it is a matter of time until the next bug/attack hands information over to attackers. In this paper, we investigate the applicability of privacy-preserving general-purpose computation, that would potentially render any information leaked indecipherable to attackers. Privacy is ensured by the use of homomorphically-encrypted memory contents. To this end, we explore the boundaries of general-purpose computation constrained for user data privacy. Specifically, we explore the minimum amount of information required for general purpose computation, which typically requires control flow and branches, and to what extent such information can be kept private from threats that have theoretically unlimited resources, including access to the internals of a target system.
Year
DOI
Venue
2014
10.1109/ISVLSI.2014.86
ISVLSI
Keywords
DocType
ISSN
computer network security,cryptography,data privacy,network servers,OpenSSL library,control flow,heartbleed attacks,homomorphically-encrypted memory contents,privacy-preserving general-purpose computation,security bug,server memory contents,user data privacy,Heartbleed,OpenSSL,encrypted processor,homomorphic encryption,privacy-preserving computation
Conference
2159-3469
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
2
0.37
12
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Nektarios Georgios Tsoutsos1629.83
M. Maniatakos235835.84