Abstract | ||
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The need to secure communications between personal devices is increasing nowadays, especially in the context of Internet of Things. Authentication between devices which have no prior common knowledge is a challenging problem. One solution consists in using a pre-authenticated auxiliary channel, human assisted or location limited, usually called out-of-band channel. A large number of device pairing protocols using an out-of-band channel were proposed, but they usually suffer from a lack of formal analysis. In this paper, we introduce a formal model, conceived as an extension of Strand Spaces, to analyze such protocols. We use it to analyze a device pairing protocol with unilateral out-of-band channel proposed by Wong & Stajano. This leads us to discover some vulnerabilities in this protocol. We propose a modified version of the protocol together with a correctness proof in our model. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2014 | 10.1109/NCA.2014.50 | Network Computing and Applications |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
cryptographic protocols,data privacy,telecommunication security,Internet of Things,formal analysis,human assisted channel,location limited channel,pre-authenticated auxiliary channel,secure communication,secure device pairing protocol,strand space extension,unilateral out-of-band channel | Authentication,Correctness proofs,Wireless,Computer science,Internet of Things,Computer network,Communication channel,Pairing,Common knowledge,Universal composability,Distributed computing | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
3 | 0.41 | 11 |
Authors | ||
2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Trung Nguyen | 1 | 3 | 0.75 |
Jean Leneutre | 2 | 203 | 17.73 |