Abstract | ||
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The network security model originally developed for the SNet secure system is generally applicable to all secure networks. Although it was recognized that allowing message loss in the model permits a covert channel, this operational model was accepted on an intuitive basis as enforcing some concept of secrecy. The paper presents a formal argument that the model, augmented with a no-loss requirement, does indeed satisfy a formal abstract secrecy policy. This secrecy policy, called INF, has previously been defined in terms of security logic. The proof contains two steps. First, the network model augmented with a no-loss requirement (and called NM) is shown to satisfy the non-deducibility (ND) condition. ND satisfies INF, therefore, NM satisfies INF |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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1991 | 10.1109/CSFW.1991.151583 | Franconia, NH |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
network operating systems,security of data,INF,NM,SNet secure system,covert channel,formal abstract secrecy policy,message loss,network security model,no-loss requirement,nondeducibility,operational model,proof of secrecy,security logic | Computer security,Computer science,Network security,Information science,Covert channel,Secrecy,Information security,Theoretical computer science,Sociotechnical system,Network model,Distributed computing | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 3 |
Authors | ||
2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Glenn H. Macewen | 1 | 134 | 37.48 |
Janice I. Glasgow | 2 | 392 | 127.97 |