Title
A proof of secrecy for a network security model
Abstract
The network security model originally developed for the SNet secure system is generally applicable to all secure networks. Although it was recognized that allowing message loss in the model permits a covert channel, this operational model was accepted on an intuitive basis as enforcing some concept of secrecy. The paper presents a formal argument that the model, augmented with a no-loss requirement, does indeed satisfy a formal abstract secrecy policy. This secrecy policy, called INF, has previously been defined in terms of security logic. The proof contains two steps. First, the network model augmented with a no-loss requirement (and called NM) is shown to satisfy the non-deducibility (ND) condition. ND satisfies INF, therefore, NM satisfies INF
Year
DOI
Venue
1991
10.1109/CSFW.1991.151583
Franconia, NH
Keywords
Field
DocType
network operating systems,security of data,INF,NM,SNet secure system,covert channel,formal abstract secrecy policy,message loss,network security model,no-loss requirement,nondeducibility,operational model,proof of secrecy,security logic
Computer security,Computer science,Network security,Information science,Covert channel,Secrecy,Information security,Theoretical computer science,Sociotechnical system,Network model,Distributed computing
Conference
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
3
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Glenn H. Macewen113437.48
Janice I. Glasgow2392127.97