Abstract | ||
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The formation of coalitions in a Gaussian inter- ference channel where the receivers are allowed to cooperate is studied under the framework of coalitional game theory. Allowing any arbitrary sharing of the total rate achieved by a coalition between its member links, it is shown that the grand coalition (coalition of all links) maximizes spectrum utilization an d is also stable, that is, the links in this coalition have no incentives to leave and form other coalitions. The issue of fairness in allocating rates to members of a grand coalition is addressed via a Nash bargaining solution where each link utility is modeled as the rate gained by being in a coalition relative to the rate achieved in the interference channel. Further, a rate allocation sol ution using proportional fairness is also presented and the results are illustrated with examples. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2006 | 10.1109/ISIT.2006.261943 | international symposium on information theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Gaussian channels,game theory,interference,telecommunication links,Gaussian interference channels,Nash bargaining solution,coalitional game theory,rate allocation solution,spectrum utilization | Mathematical economics,Computer science,Gaussian channels,Communication channel,Game theory,Interference (wave propagation),Gaussian interference channel,Core (game theory),Gaussian interference,Bargaining problem | Conference |
ISBN | Citations | PageRank |
1-4244-0504-1 | 24 | 1.86 |
References | Authors | |
7 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Suhas Mathur | 1 | 769 | 33.94 |
Lalitha Sankaranarayanan | 2 | 83 | 6.54 |
Mandayam, Narayan B. | 3 | 966 | 89.51 |