Title
A systematic M safe-error detection in hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms
Abstract
This paper presents a procedure that checks whether a hardware implementation of a cryptographic algorithm is vulnerable to M safe-error attacks. It takes a registertransfer level (RTL) description of a design as an input and exposes the exact timing and a memory element that is a possible target of the attack. As a proof of concept, the presented procedure is applied to a hardware implementation of the Montgomery Powering Ladder, an exponentiation algorithm commonly used in public-key cryptography.
Year
DOI
Venue
2012
10.1109/HST.2012.6224327
Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
Keywords
Field
DocType
digital arithmetic,public key cryptography,M safe-error attacks,RTL,cryptographic algorithms,exact timing,exponentiation algorithm,hardware implementations,memory element,montgomery powering ladder,public-key cryptography,register transfer level description,systematic M safe-error detection,Fault attacks,Fault detection,M safe-errors,RTL description
Hardware implementations,Cryptography,Fault detection and isolation,Computer science,Algorithm,Real-time computing,Error detection and correction,Proof of concept,Exponentiation,Public-key cryptography
Conference
ISBN
Citations 
PageRank 
978-1-4673-2341-3
1
0.35
References 
Authors
4
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Dusko Karaklajic110.35
Junfeng Fan233429.09
Ingrid Verbauwhede3194.83