Paper Info
Title
Efficient and side-channel resistant authenticated encryption of FPGA bitstreams
Abstract
State-of-the-art solutions for FPGA bitstream protection rely on encryption and authentication of the bitstream to both ensure its confidentiality, thwarting unauthorized copying and reverse engineering, and prevent its unauthorized modification, maintaining a root of trust in the field. Adequate protection of the FPGA bitstream is of paramount importance to sustain the central functionality of dynamic reconfiguration in a hostile environment. In this work, we propose a new solution for authenticated encryption (AE) tailored for FPGA bitstream protection. It is based on the recent proposal presented at DIAC'12: the AES-based authenticated encryption scheme ALE. Our comparison to existing AES-based schemes reveals that ALE is at least twice more resource-efficient than the best AE modes of operation instantiated with AES. In the view of the recent successful side-channel attacks on Xilinx Virtex bitstream encryption, we investigate the possibility for side-channel resistant implementations of all these AES-based AE algorithms using state-of-the-art threshold masking techniques. Also in this side-channel resistant setting, the protected ALE design is about twice more resource-efficient than the best AE modes of operation with the same countermeasure. We conclude that the deployment of dedicated AE schemes such as ALE significantly facilitates the real-world efficiency and security of FPGA bitstream protection in practice: Not only our solution enables authenticated encryption for bitstream on low-cost FPGAs but it also aims to mitigate physical attacks which have been lately shown to undermine the security of the bitstream protection mechanisms in the field.
Year
DOI
Venue
2012
10.1109/ReConFig.2012.6416743
Reconfigurable Computing and FPGAs
Keywords
Field
DocType
cryptography,field programmable gate arrays,AES-based AE algorithms,AES-based authenticated encryption scheme,ALE,DIAC,FPGA bitstream protection,Xilinx Virtex bitstream encryption,bitstream confidentiality,dynamic reconfiguration,real-world efficiency,real-world security,reverse engineering,side-channel resistant authenticated encryption,threshold masking techniques,unauthorized copying,FPGA,authenticated encryption,bitstream,side-channel analysis
Computer science,Cryptography,Real-time computing,Encryption,Virtex,Side channel attack,40-bit encryption,Bitstream,On-the-fly encryption,Authenticated encryption,Embedded system
Conference
ISSN
ISBN
Citations 
2325-6532
978-1-4673-2919-4
3
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.49
12
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Andrey Bogdanov1206798.10
Amir Moradi296080.66
Tolga Yalçin31209.20