Title
Bandwagon effect in mean-field games
Abstract
This paper provides a mean-field game theoretic model of the bandwagon effect in social networks. The latter phenomenon can be observed whenever individuals tend to align their own opinions to a mainstream opinion. The contribution is three-fold. First, we provide a mean-field games framework that describes the opinion propagation under local interaction. Second, we establish mean-field equilibrium strategies in the case where the mainstream opinion is stationary. Such strategies are shown to have a threshold structure. Third, we study conditions under which a given opinion distribution is stationary if agents implement optimal non-idle and threshold strategies.
Year
DOI
Venue
2013
10.1109/CDC.2013.6760044
Decision and Control
Keywords
Field
DocType
game theory,network theory (graphs),social sciences,bandwagon effect,local interaction,mainstream opinion,mean-field equilibrium strategies,mean-field game theoretic model,opinion distribution,opinion propagation,optimal nonidle strategy,social networks,threshold strategy,threshold structure
Mathematical economics,Mathematical optimization,Social network,Computer science,Mean field theory,Game theoretic,Game theory,Phenomenon,Mainstream,Management science,Bandwagon effect
Conference
ISSN
ISBN
Citations 
0743-1546
978-1-4673-5714-2
1
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.37
5
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Leonardo Stella1114.01
Fabio Bagagiolo2313.88
Dario Bauso321235.09
Raffaele Pesenti427738.44