Title
Adversarial detection as a zero-sum game
Abstract
We propose a new game theoretic approach to estimate a binary random variable based on a vector of sensor measurements that may be corrupted by an adversary. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum partial information game in which a detector attempts to minimize the probability of error and an attacker attempts to maximize this probability. Explicit mixed policies are computed using the matrix form of the game and exploiting sensor symmetry to reduce complexity and find closed-form solutions.
Year
DOI
Venue
2012
10.1109/CDC.2012.6426383
Decision and Control
Keywords
Field
DocType
computational complexity,game theory,matrix algebra,sensors,adversarial detection,complexity reduction,game theoretic approach,matrix form,probability,sensor measurements,sensor symmetry,zero-sum game,zero-sum partial information game,Adversarial detection,byzantine sensors,computer security,estimation,mixed policies,zero-sum games
Minimax,Mathematical optimization,Computer science,Algorithmic game theory,Zero-sum game,Normal-form game,Bondareva–Shapley theorem,Example of a game without a value,Game complexity,Extensive-form game
Conference
ISSN
ISBN
Citations 
0743-1546 E-ISBN : 978-1-4673-2064-1
978-1-4673-2064-1
3
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.41
4
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Kyriakos G. Vamvoudakis1274.74
João P. Hespanha27674587.34
Bruno Sinopoli32837188.08
Yilin Mo489151.51