Abstract | ||
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The reverse supply chain in our study consists of the disassembly centre and the collector. In this paper, we study the contract of the reverse supply chain with risk-neutral collector and risk-averse disassembly centre. Furthermore, we compare the contract with other two contracts given by our previous research: contract of risk-neutral collector and risk-neutral disassembly centre, and contract of risk-averse collector and risk-neutral disassembly centre. At the end, we analyze the optimal results by a numerical example. From the analysis, we find: if the disassembly centre is risk averse and the collector is risk neutral, the collector must share a large part of the penalty. This will result in a smaller optimal quantity of the used-products and lower profit of the collector and the disassembly centre. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2015 | 10.1109/ICInfA.2015.7279635 | 2015 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION AND AUTOMATION |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Reverse logistics, contract, risk preference, risk-averse, risk-neutral | Computer science,Risk neutral,Reverse logistics,Control engineering,Reverse supply chain,Profitability index,Electronic waste,Supply chain,Risk aversion,Industrial organization | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 3 |
Authors | ||
2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
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Qiaolun Gu | 1 | 18 | 4.65 |
Tiegang Gao | 2 | 68 | 22.08 |