Paper Info
Title
Two-Person Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Semicontinuous Payoff
Abstract
Consider a two-person, zero-sum stochastic game with Borel state space S, finite action sets A,B, and Borel measurable law of motion q. Suppose the payoff is a bounded function f of the infinite history of states and actions that is measurable for the product of the Borel σ-field for S and the σ-fields of all subsets for A and B, and is lower semicontinuous for the product of the discrete topologies on the coordinate spaces. Then the game has a value and player II has a subgame perfect optimal strategy.
Year
DOI
Venue
2013
10.1007/s13235-012-0054-7
Dynamic Games and Applications
Keywords
DocType
Volume
subgame perfect,borel sets
Journal
3
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
2
2153-0793
1
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.37
0
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Rida Laraki15511.62
maitra a210.37
William D. Sudderth36216.34