Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We present a unified framework for characterizing local Nash equilibria in continuous games on either infinite-dimensional or finite-dimensional non-convex strategy spaces. We provide intrinsic necessary and sufficient first- and second-order conditions ensuring strategies constitute local Nash equilibria. We term points satisfying the sufficient conditions differential Nash equilibria. Further, we provide a sufficient condition (non-degeneracy) guaranteeing differential Nash equilibria are isolated and show that such equilibria are structurally stable. We present tutorial examples to illustrate our results and highlight degeneracies that can arise in continuous games. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2016 | 10.1109/TAC.2016.2583518 | IEEE Trans. Automat. Contr. |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Games,Nash equilibrium,Cost function,Manifolds,Programming,Manganese | Correlated equilibrium,Mathematical economics,Mathematical optimization,Risk dominance,Epsilon-equilibrium,Best response,Normal-form game,Nash equilibrium,Folk theorem,Mathematics,Trembling hand perfect equilibrium | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
61 | 8 | 0018-9286 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
14 | 0.68 | 18 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lillian J. Ratliff | 1 | 87 | 23.32 |
| Samuel A. Burden | 2 | 37 | 3.40 |
| Shankar Sastry | 3 | 11977 | 1291.58 |