Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The fixed-route traveling salesman problem with appointments, simply the appointment problem, is concerned with the following situation. Starting from home, a traveler makes a scheduled visit to a group of sponsors and returns home. If a sponsor in the route cancels her appointment, the traveler returns home and waits for the next appointment. We are interested in finding a way of dividing the total traveling cost among sponsors in the appointment problem by applying solutions developed in the cooperative game theory. We show that the well-known solutions of the cooperative game theory, the Shapley value, the nucleolus (or the prenucleolus), and the \( \tau \)-value, coincide under a mild condition on the traveling cost. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2016 | 10.1007/s00182-015-0478-6 | Int. J. Game Theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
t value,nucleolus,shapley value | Mathematical economics,Shapley value,Travelling salesman problem,Cooperative game theory,Game theoretic,Coincidence,Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
45 | 3 | 1432-1270 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 4 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Youngsub Chun | 1 | 94 | 20.80 |
| nari park | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Duygu Yengin | 3 | 19 | 2.91 |