Title
On the Equivalence between (Quasi)-perfect and sequential equilibria
Abstract
We prove the generic equivalence between quasi-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. Combining this result with Blume and Zame (Econometrica 62:783–794, 1994) shows that perfect, quasi-perfect and sequential equilibrium coincide in generic games.
Year
DOI
Venue
2014
10.2139/ssrn.1984333
International Journal of Game Theory
Keywords
Field
DocType
backwards induction,backward induction,sequential equilibrium
Sequential equilibrium,Mathematical economics,Quasi-perfect equilibrium,Subgame perfect equilibrium,Equivalence (measure theory),Mertens-stable equilibrium,Proper equilibrium,Mathematics,Trembling hand perfect equilibrium,Backward induction
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
43
2
1432-1270
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
1
0.45
0
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Carlos Pimienta183.92
Jianfei Shen244.21