Title
Differential games with asymmetric information and without Isaacs’ condition
Abstract
We investigate a two-player zero-sum differential game with asymmetric information on the payoff and without Isaacs’ condition. The dynamics is an ordinary differential equation parametrized by two controls chosen by the players. Each player has a private information on the payoff of the game, while his opponent knows only the probability distribution on the information of the other player. We show that a suitable definition of random strategies allows to prove the existence of a value in mixed strategies. This value is taken in the sense of the limit of any time discretization, as the mesh of the time partition tends to zero. We characterize it in terms of the unique viscosity solution in some dual sense of a Hamilton–Jacobi–Isaacs equation. Here we do not suppose the Isaacs’ condition, which is usually assumed in differential games.
Year
DOI
Venue
2016
10.1007/s00182-015-0482-x
Int. J. Game Theory
Keywords
Field
DocType
asymmetric information,viscosity solution
Discretization,Mathematical economics,Ordinary differential equation,Differential game,Probability distribution,Repeated game,Viscosity solution,Bayesian game,Mathematics,Stochastic game
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
45
4
1432-1270
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
4
0.46
7
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Rainer Buckdahn16218.36
M. Quincampoix246350.08
Catherine Rainer3314.03
Yuhong Xu481.63