Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
A risk neutral seller and buyer with private information bargain over an indivisible item. We prove that optimal robust bilateral trade mechanisms are payoff equivalent to non-wasteful randomized posted prices. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2016 | 10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.008 | Journal of Economic Theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
C78,D40,D82 | Welfare economics,Economics,Risk neutral,Microeconomics,Robustness (computer science),Bilateral trade,Mechanism design,Private information retrieval,Complete information,Stochastic game,Neutrality | Journal |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
163 | 0022-0531 | 1 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.38 | 1 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| jernej copic | 1 | 1 | 0.72 |
| Clara Ponsati | 2 | 21 | 11.33 |