Title
Counting Keys in Parallel After a Side Channel Attack
Abstract
Side channels provide additional information to skilled adversaries that reduce the effort to determine an unknown key. If sufficient side channel information is available, identification of the secret key can even become trivial. However, if not enough side information is available, some effort is still required to find the key in the key space which now has reduced entropy. To understand the security implications of side channel attacks it is then crucial to evaluate this remaining effort in a meaningful manner. Quantifying this effort can be done by looking at two key questions: first, how u0027deepu0027 at most is the unknown key in the remaining key space, and second, how u0027expensiveu0027 is it to enumerate keys upi¾?to a certain depth?We provide results for these two challenges. Firstly, we show how to construct an extremely efficient algorithm that accurately computes the rank of a known key in the list of all keys, when ordered according to some side channel attack scores. Secondly, we show how our approach can be tweaked such that it can be also utilised to enumerate the most likely keys in a parallel fashion. We are hence the first to demonstrate that a smart and parallel key enumeration algorithm exists.
Year
DOI
Venue
2015
10.1007/978-3-662-48800-3_13
Proceedings, Part II, of the 21st International Conference on Advances in Cryptology --- ASIACRYPT 2015 - Volume 9453
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Key enumeration,Key rank,Side channels
Conference
9453
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0302-9743
17
0.71
References 
Authors
11
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Daniel P. Martin1434.20
Jonathan F. O'Connell2170.71
Elisabeth Oswald319717.67
Martijn Stam4165967.36