Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
A necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementability when preferences are quasilinear is that, for every individual i and every choice of the types of the other individuals, all k-cycles in i’s allocation graph have nonnegative length for every integer k ≥ 2. Saks and Yu (Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC’05), pp 286–293, 2005) have shown that when the number of outcomes is finite and i’s valuation type space is convex, nonnegativity of the length of all 2-cycles is sufficient for the nonnegativity of the length of all k-cycles. In this article, it is shown that if each individual’s valuation type space is a full-dimensional convex product space and a mild domain regularity condition is satisfied, then (i) the nonnegativity of all 2-cycles implies that all k-cycles have zero length and (ii) all 2-cycles having zero length is necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementability. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2012 | 10.1007/s00355-011-0604-8 | Social Choice and Welfare |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
mechanism design,product space,satisfiability,revenue equivalence,electronic commerce,valuation | Integer,Discrete mathematics,Graph,Mathematical economics,Strategic dominance,Regular polygon,Mechanism design,Product topology,Revenue equivalence,Valuation (finance),Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
39 | 2-3 | 1432-217X |
Citations | PageRank | References |
2 | 0.44 | 6 |
Authors | ||
5 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Katherine Cuff | 1 | 6 | 1.10 |
| Sung-Hoon Hong | 2 | 7 | 4.43 |
| JESSE A. SCHWARTZ | 3 | 3 | 0.92 |
| Quan Wen | 4 | 13 | 5.09 |
| John A. Weymark | 5 | 78 | 17.52 |