Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We investigate the implications of the principle of welfare-domination under preference-replacement or replacement in the context of bargaining. It requires that changes in the preferences of some agents, unaccompanied by changes in the
resources, should affect all of the agents whose preferences have not changed in the same direction: all gain or all lose
together. We begin with investigating the logical relations between replacement and two monotonicity axioms, weak monotonicity and population monotonicity. Then, we establish characterizations of the Kalai–Smorodinsky and egalitarian solutions on the basis of replacement. On the other hand, we obtain impossibility results if Pareto optimality and replacement are imposed together with either strong individual rationality or symmetry. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2005 | 10.1007/s00355-005-0043-5 | Social Choice and Welfare |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Pareto Optimality, Logical Relation, Impossibility Result, Bargaining Problem, Nash Solution | Welfare economics,Population,Logical relations,Monotonic function,Mathematical economics,Economics,Rationality,Axiom,Impossibility,Pareto principle,Bargaining problem | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
25 | 1 | 1432-217X |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 2 |
Authors | ||
1 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Youngsub Chun | 1 | 94 | 20.80 |