Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
When discussing knowledge, two relations are of interest: (for all the agent is justified in believing in , she is in ) and (the agent would have in exactly the same justified beliefs that she has in ). Speaking of compatibility with the agent’s justified beliefs is potentially ambiguous: either of the two relations or can be meant. I discuss the possibility of identifying the relation of (for all the agent knows in , she is in ) with the union of and . Neither Gettier’s examples nor the ‘fake barn’ cases contradict this identification. However, the proposal leads to justification equivalent scenarios being symmetric with respect to knowledge: we cannot know a true proposition in a scenario if it is false in a justification equivalent scenario. This analysis may appear to render non-trivial knowledge impossible. This conclusion follows if the extra premise is granted that for all relevant true propositions there is a justification equivalent scenario in which the proposition is false. I provide a meaning-theoretic argument against this premise. I conclude by pointing out problems that would ensue from giving up the proposed connection between , and and allowing asymmetry of justification equivalent scenarios relative to knowledge. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2016 | 10.1007/s11229-015-0742-0 | Synthese |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Epistemic logic,Gettier cases,Indistinguishability,Justified belief,Knowledge,Skepticism | Epistemic modal logic,Proposition,Premise,Equivalence (measure theory),Skepticism,Artificial intelligence,Epistemology,Mathematics,Doxastic logic | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
193 | 1 | 0039-7857 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 0 |
Authors | ||
1 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tero Tulenheimo | 1 | 16 | 5.19 |