Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We study the interactions among Internet providers in vehicular networks which offer access to commuters via road side units (RSUs). Namely, we propose a game-theoretical framework to model the competition on prices between vehicular Internet providers to capture the largest amount of users, thus selfishly maximizing the revenues. The equilibria of the aforementioned game are characterized under different mobile traffic conditions, RSU capabilities and users requirements and expectations. In particular, we also consider in the analysis the case where mobile users modify the price they accept to pay for the access as the likeliness of finding an access solution decreases. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2015 | 10.1016/j.comnet.2015.06.008 | Computer Networks |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Vehicular networks,Game theory,Pricing,Competition | Journal | 88 |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
1389-1286 | 1 | 0.37 |
References | Authors | |
28 | 3 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vladimir Fux | 1 | 5 | 2.46 |
| Patrick Maillé | 2 | 282 | 43.33 |
| Matteo Cesana | 3 | 826 | 63.33 |