Paper Info
Title
Demystifying incentives in the consensus computer.
Abstract
Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and the more recent Ethereum system allow users to specify scripts in transactions and contracts to support applications beyond simple cash transactions. In this work, we analyze the extent to which these systems can enforce the correct semantics of scripts. We show that when a script execution requires nontrivial computation effort, practical attacks exist which either waste miners' computational resources or lead miners to accept incorrect script results. These attacks drive miners to an ill-fated choice, which we call the verifier's dilemma, whereby rational miners are well-incentivized to accept unvalidated blockchains. We call the framework of computation through a scriptable cryptocurrency a consensus computer and develop a model that captures incentives for verifying computation in it. We propose a resolution to the verifier's dilemma which incentivizes correct execution of certain applications, including outsourced computation, where scripts require minimal time to verify. Finally we discuss two distinct, practical implementations of our consensus computer in real cryptocurrency networks like Ethereum.
Year
DOI
Venue
2015
10.1145/2810103.2813659
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Bitcoin, Ethereum, cryptocurrency, incentive compatibility, verifiable computation, consensus computer
Journal
2015
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
36
2.75
21
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Loi Luu139323.07
Jason Teutsch212016.84
Raghav Kulkarni317219.48
Prateek Saxena4191597.73