Title
On the Failure of Hindsight-Biased Principals to Delegate Optimally
Abstract
With the help of a simple model, we show that the hindsight bias can lead to inefficient delegation decisions. This prediction is tested experimentally. In an online experiment that was conducted during the FIFA World Cup 2010, participants were asked to predict a number of outcomes of the ongoing World Cup and had to recall their assessments after the outcomes had been realized. Their answers were used to construct individual measures of the hindsight bias. The participants also had to make choices in a delegation game. Our data confirm that hindsight-biased subjects more frequently fail to delegate optimally than subjects whom we have classified as not hindsight biased. Data, as supplemental material, are available at <ext-link ext-link-type=\"uri\" xlink=\"http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2087\"http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2087</ext-link>. This paper was accepted by Teck-Hua Ho, judgment and decision making.
Year
DOI
Venue
2015
10.1287/mnsc.2014.2087
Management Science
Keywords
Field
DocType
hindsight bias,delegation,experiments
Economics,Actuarial science,Computer security,Delegate,Microeconomics,Delegation,Hindsight bias,Recall
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
61
8
0025-1909
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
2
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
David Danz100.68
Dorothea Kübler2187.50
Lydia Mechtenberg301.35
Julia Schmid400.34