Paper Info
Title
An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism.
Abstract
For the problem of reallocating indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences, Ma characterized the Top-Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism using the properties of Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. A simpler, direct proof of this result is presented here.
Year
DOI
Venue
2016
10.1016/j.orl.2015.11.010
Operations Research Letters
Keywords
Field
DocType
Housing market,Core mechanism,Top-trading cycles
Mathematical optimization,Mathematical economics,Rationality,Pareto efficiency,Mathematics,Direct proof
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
44
1
0167-6377
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
2
0.42
1
Authors
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Jay Sethuraman143942.32