Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The security of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-(like)-noise (KLJN) key exchange system is based on the fluctuation-dissipation theorem of classical statistical physics. Similarly to quantum key distribution, in practical situations, due to the non-idealities of the building elements, there is a small information leak, which can be mitigated by privacy amplification or other techniques so that unconditional (information-theoretic) security is preserved. In this paper, the industrial cable and circuit simulator LTSPICE is used to validate the information leak due to one of the non-idealities in KLJN, the parasitic (cable) capacitance. Simulation results show that privacy amplification and/or capacitor killer (capacitance compensation) arrangements can effectively eliminate the leak. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2015 | 10.3390/info6040719 | INFORMATION |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
KLJN, cable capacitance attack, capacitor killer, secure key exchange, unconditional security, privacy amplification | Quantum key distribution,Data mining,Leak,Capacitor,Capacitance,Key exchange,Computer security,Computer science,Electronic circuit simulation,Electrical engineering | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
6 | 4 | 2078-2489 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
3 | 0.46 | 18 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hsien-Pu Chen | 1 | 47 | 4.29 |
| Elias Gonzalez | 2 | 21 | 2.06 |
| Yessica Saez | 3 | 34 | 3.69 |
| Laszlo B. Kish | 4 | 251 | 35.07 |