Paper Info
Title
Towards modelling perfect forward secrecy in two‐message authenticated key exchange under ephemeral‐key revelation
Abstract
We examine the recently introduced CF and CF-perfect forward secrecy (PFS) models for two-message authenticated key exchange (TMAKE) by Cremers et al., where the difference between CF and CF-PFS model is that the CF formulates the weak PFS (wPFS), whereas the CF-PFS formulates the PFS. The CF model is claimed by Cremers et al. to be strictly stronger the previous extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. However, we notice that the implication relations among CF, CF-PFS, eCK and eCK-PFS model have not been completely studied. Based on TMAKE, we particularly show that CF model and eCK model imply each other under random oracle model. Moreover, we provide a new result on the generic security strengthening transformation (compiler) for building CF-PFS-secure TMAKE protocols. In contrast to a previous work, we show that it is possible to apply the transformation to all CF-secure AKE protocols including all eCK-secure TMAKE protocols in the random oracle model, without restricting to a small specific class of Diffie-Hellman key based protocols. Copyright (C) 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
Year
DOI
Venue
2015
10.1002/sec.1263
SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
Keywords
Field
DocType
perfect forward secrecy,authenticated key exchange,security model,one-round,protocol compiler,two-message
Computer science,Computer security,Authenticated Key Exchange,Random oracle,Compiler,Forward secrecy,Notice,Ephemeral key,Computer security model
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
8
18
1939-0114
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
3
0.39
18
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Zheng Yang130.73
Yang Wu28418.42
Lingyun Zhu3395.48
Daigu Zhang430.39