Abstract | ||
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TWINE is a lightweight block cipher which employs a generalized Feistel structure with 16 nibble-blocks. It has two versions: TWINE-80 and TWINE-128, both have a block length of 64 bits and employ keys of length 80 and 128 bits, respectively. In this paper, we propose a low data complexity key recovery attack on the full cipher. This attack is inspired by the 3-subset Meet-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack. However, in our attack, we remove the restrictions of the 3-subset MitM by allowing the key to be partitioned into n≥3 subsets and by not restricting these subsets to be independent. To improve the computational complexity of the attack, we adopt a recomputation strategy similar to the one used in the original biclique attack. Adopting this approach, we present a known plaintext key recovery attack on TWINE-80 and TWINE-128 with time complexities of 278.74 and 2126.1, respectively. Both attacks require only two plaintext–ciphertext pairs. Furthermore, by combining our technique with a splice-and-cut approach, we gain a slight improvement in the time complexity of the attack at the expense of increasing the number of required plaintext–ciphertext pairs. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2016 | 10.1016/j.ipl.2015.09.011 | Information Processing Letters |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Cryptography,Meet-in-the-Middle attacks,Low data complexity attacks,TWINE,Bicliques | Biclique attack,Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir attack,Birthday attack,Pre-play attack,Theoretical computer science,Chosen-ciphertext attack,Slide attack,Ciphertext-only attack,Mathematics,Key-recovery attack | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
116 | 2 | 0020-0190 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
2 | 0.37 | 16 |
Authors | ||
2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
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Mohamed Tolba | 1 | 20 | 6.35 |
Amr Youssef | 2 | 238 | 29.69 |