Paper Info
Title
Facilitating Incentive-Compatible Access Probability Selection In Wireless Random Access Networks
Abstract
This paper studies the impact of integrating pricing with connection admission control (CAC) on the congestion management practices in contention-based wireless random access networks. Notably, when the network is free of charge, each self-interested user tries to occupy the channel as much as possible, resulting in the inefficient utilization of network resources. Pricing is therefore adopted as incentive mechanism to encourage users to choose their access probabilities considering the real-time network congestion level. A Stackelberg leader-follower game is formulated to analyze the competitive interaction between the service provider and the users. In particular, each user chooses the access probability that optimizes its payoff, while the self-interested service provider decides whether to admit or to reject the user's connection request in order to optimize its revenue. The stability of the Stackelberg leader-follower game in terms of convergence to the Nash equilibrium is established. The proposed CAC scheme is completely distributed and can be implemented by individual access points using only local information. Compared to the existing schemes, the proposed scheme achieves higher revenue gain, higher user payoff, and higher QoS performance.
Year
DOI
Venue
2015
10.1587/transcom.E98.B.2280
IEICE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS
Keywords
Field
DocType
CAC, Stackelberg game, backward induction, pricing, wireless random access network
Incentive compatibility,Wireless,Wireless distribution system,Computer science,Computer network,Stackelberg competition,Random access,Backward induction,Distributed computing
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
E98B
11
0916-8516
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
4
0.47
15
Authors
6
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Bo Gu13315.79
Cheng Zhang25912.03
Kyoko Yamori35916.35
Zhenyu Zhou439544.36
Song Liu540.81
Yoshiaki Tanaka64914.72