Paper Info
Title
Average-Case Analysis Of Certificate Revocation In Combinatorial Certificate Management Schemes
Abstract
To overcome the privacy limitations of conventional PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) systems, combinatorial certificate schemes assign each certificate to multiple users so that users can perform anonymous authentication. From a certificate pool of N certificates, each user is given n certificates. If a misbehaving user revokes a certificate, all the other users who share the revoked certificate will also not be able to use it. When an honest user shares a certificate with a misbehaving user and the certificate is revoked by the misbehaving user, the certificate of the honest user is said to be covered. To date, only the analysis for the worst scenario has been conducted; the probability that all n certificates of an honest user are covered when m misbehaving users revoke their certificates is known. The subject of this article is the following question: how many certificates (among n certificates) of an honest user are covered on average when m misbehaving users revoke their certificates? We present the first average-case analysis of the cover probability in combinatorial certificate schemes.
Year
DOI
Venue
2016
10.1587/transfun.E99.A.663
IEICE TRANSACTIONS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF ELECTRONICS COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SCIENCES
Keywords
Field
DocType
public key infrastructure, privacy, anonymity, combinatorial certificate scheme, certificate revocation
Online Certificate Status Protocol,Root certificate,Revocation list,Computer security,Self-signed certificate,Public key certificate,Certification path validation algorithm,Mathematics,Implicit certificate,Authorization certificate
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
E99A
2
1745-1337
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
4
Authors
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Dae Hyun Yum131524.95