Title
Prevention of Exponential Equivalence in Simple Password Exponential Key Exchange (SPEKE)
Abstract
Simple Password Exponential Key Exchange (SPEKE) and Dragonfly are simple password-based authenticated key exchange protocols that use a value derived from a shared password as a generator for modular exponentiation, as opposed to Diffie-Hellman key exchange, which uses a fixed value. However, it has been shown that in SPEKE, an active attacker, can examine multiple passwords in a single attempt because the passwords have an exponential correlation. We show that Dragonfly can also suffer from the same problem, and we propose a simple countermeasure to prevent the exponential equivalence in SPEKE.
Year
DOI
Venue
2015
10.3390/sym7031587
SYMMETRY-BASEL
Keywords
Field
DocType
Exponential equivalence,password authentication,key exchange,SPEKE,Dragonfly
Combinatorics,Zero-knowledge password proof,Password strength,Key exchange,Authenticated Key Exchange,Theoretical computer science,Equivalence (measure theory),Password,SPEKE,Mathematics,Modular exponentiation,Distributed computing
Journal
Volume
Issue
Citations 
7
3
1
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.37
4
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Hanwook Lee121.77
Dongho Won21262154.14