Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In a cooperative game with transferable utility, it is usually assumed that all coalitions are equally feasible. However, if we deal with cooperative games with coalition configuration, only some coalitions are a priori feasible, due to the preferences of the agents. In this paper, we propose a generalization of games with coalition configuration. In our model, the feasibility of a coalition is de... |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2016 | 10.1109/TFUZZ.2015.2459761 | IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Games,Indexes,Fuzzy sets,Resource management,Software design,Linearity,Context | Cohesion (chemistry),Resource management,Social group,Mathematical economics,Software design,A priori and a posteriori,Fuzzy set,Transferable utility,Mathematics,Core (game theory) | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
24 | 2 | 1063-6706 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 6 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro | 1 | 107 | 12.14 |
| J. Manuel Gallardo | 2 | 4 | 2.24 |
| Andrés Jiménez-Losada | 3 | 29 | 11.16 |
| M.A. Mosquera | 4 | 52 | 6.39 |