Title
Convergence analysis for pure stationary strategies in repeated potential games: Nash, Lyapunov and correlated equilibria
Abstract
•We formally introduce Lyapunov games for Markov chains.•We provide the convergence analysis for pure stationary strategies in Lyapunov games.•We provide an algorithm for the numerical realization of the best-reply strategy.•We prove under mild assumptions that the Nash, Lyapunov and Correlated equilibria coincide.
Year
DOI
Venue
2016
10.1016/j.eswa.2015.11.006
Expert Systems with Applications
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Nash equilibrium,Lyapunov equilibrium,Correlated equilibrium,Convergence,Complexity analysis,Repeated Markov games,Best-reply analysis
Journal
46
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0957-4174
1
0.35
References 
Authors
13
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Julio B. Clempner19120.11
Alexander S. Poznyak235863.68