Paper Info
Title
Setting Cournot Versus Lyapunov Games Stability Conditions And Equilibrium Point Properties
Abstract
In potential games, the best-reply dynamics results in the existence of a cost function such that each player's best-reply set equals the set of minimizers of the potential given by the opponents' strategies. The study of sequential best-reply dynamics dates back to Cournot and, an equilibrium point which is stable under the game's best-reply dynamics is commonly said to be Cournot stable. However, it is exactly the best-reply behavior that we obtain using the Lyapunov notion of stability in game theory. In addition, Lyapunov theory presents several advantages. In this paper, we show that the stability conditions and the equilibrium point properties of Cournot and Lyapunov meet in potential games.
Year
DOI
Venue
2015
10.1142/S0219198915500115
INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Keywords
Field
DocType
Cournot, Lyapunov, potential games, dominance-solvable games, routing games, shortest-path, best-reply
Lyapunov function,Mathematical optimization,Mathematical economics,Economics,Shortest path problem,Stability conditions,Equilibrium point,Game theory,Cournot competition
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
17
4
0219-1989
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
2
0.41
7
Authors
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Julio B. Clempner19120.11