Abstract | ||
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We study optimal redistributive taxes when individuals differ in two characteristics—earning ability and leisure needs—assumed to be imperfectly correlated. Individuals have private information about their abilities but needs are observable. With different levels of observable needs the population can be separated into groups and needs may be used as a tag. We first assume that the social planner considers individuals should be compensated for their leisure needs and characterize the optimal redistributive policy, and the extent of compensation for needs, with tagging. We also consider an alternative social objective where individuals are deemed responsible for their needs. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2015 | 10.1007/s00355-015-0875-6 | Social Choice and Welfare |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
H21, H41 | Welfare economics,Public economics,Population,Economics,Mathematical economics,Microeconomics,Social planner,Work–life balance,Private information retrieval | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
45 | 4 | 1432-217X |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 0 |
Authors | ||
2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Pierre Pestieau | 1 | 9 | 3.75 |
Maria Racionero | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |