Paper Info
Title
Towards Balancing Privacy and Efficiency: A Principal-Agent Model of Data-Centric Business
Abstract
Personal data has emerged as a crucial asset of the digital economy. However, unregulated markets for personal data severely threaten consumers' privacy. Based upon a commodity-centric notion of privacy, this paper takes a principal-agent perspective on data-centric business. Specifically, this paper presents an economic model of the privacy problem in data-centric business, in that drawing from contract theory. Building upon a critical analysis of the model, this paper analyzes how regulatory and technological instruments could balance efficiency of markets for personal data and data-subjects' right to informational self-determination.
Year
DOI
Venue
2015
10.1007/978-3-319-24858-5_6
STM
Keywords
Field
DocType
Privacy economics,Privacy,Property rights,Accountability,Principal-agent model
Property rights,Internet privacy,Contract theory,Privacy by Design,Computer security,Computer science,Privacy policy,Digital economy,Principal–agent problem,Information privacy,Privacy software
Conference
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
9331
0302-9743
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
22
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Christian Zimmermann143.45
Claus-Georg Nolte200.34