Abstract | ||
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In this paper, we consider the problem of online incentive mechanism design for smart-phone crowd-sourcing. We consider the online setting where users arrive in a sequence and each user participating in crowd-sourcing submits a set of tasks it can accomplish and its corresponding bid. The platform then selects the users and their payments to maximize its utility while ensuring truthfulness, individual rationality, profitability, and polynomial algorithm complexity. The decision whether to accept or reject each user is made instantaneously, with no revocation. We propose an algorithm and show that it satisfies all the four desired properties of an efficient auction. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance of our online algorithm. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2015 | 10.1109/WIOPT.2015.7151099 | 2015 13th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks (WiOpt) |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
online incentive mechanism design,smartphone crowd-sourcing,polynomial algorithm complexity,online algorithm | Mobile computing,Online algorithm,Algorithm design,Incentive,Computer science,Computer network,Revocation,Profitability index,Mechanism design,Mobile telephony,Distributed computing | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
3 | 0.39 | 13 |
Authors | ||
4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
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Ashwin Subramanian | 1 | 7 | 0.81 |
G. Sai Kanth | 2 | 7 | 0.81 |
Sharayu Moharir | 3 | 47 | 17.11 |
Rahul Vaze | 4 | 463 | 45.64 |