Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of the interval game with no additional uncertainty. We introduce new selection-based classes of interval games and prove their characterization theorems and relations to existing classes based on the interval weakly better operator. We show a new results regarding the core and imputations and examine a problem of equality of two different versions of core, which is the main stability solution of cooperative games.. Then we introduce definition of strong imputation and strong core as a universal solution concept of interval games. |
Year | Venue | DocType |
|---|---|---|
2015 | international conference on operations research and enterprise systems | Conference |
Volume | Citations | PageRank |
abs/1410.3877 | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
3 | 2 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan Bok | 1 | 1 | 4.43 |
| Milan Hladík | 2 | 268 | 36.33 |