Title
Learning Cooperative Games
Abstract
This paper explores a PAC (probably approximately correct) learning model in cooperative games. Specifically, we are given m random samples of coalitions and their values, taken from some unknown cooperative game; can we predict the values of unseen coalitions? We study the PAC learnability of several well-known classes of cooperative games, such as network flow games, threshold task games, and induced subgraph games. We also establish a novel connection between PAC learnability and core stability: for games that are efficiently learnable, it is possible to find payoff divisions that are likely to be stable using a polynomial number of samples.
Year
Venue
Field
2015
IJCAI
Flow network,Probably approximately correct learning,Polynomial,Induced subgraph,Artificial intelligence,Learnability,Mathematics,Stochastic game
DocType
Volume
Citations 
Journal
abs/1505.00039
5
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.45
28
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Maria-Florina Balcan11445105.01
Ariel D. Procaccia21875148.20
Yair Zick314322.98