Abstract | ||
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In this paper we present a new post-quantum electronic-voting protocol. Our construction is based on LWE fully homomorphic encryption and the protocol is inspired by existing e-voting schemes, in particular Helios. The strengths of our scheme are its simplicity and transparency, since it relies on public homomorphic operations. Furthermore, the use of lattice-based primitives greatly simplifies the proofs of correctness, privacy and verifiability, as no zero-knowledge proof are needed to prove the validity of individual ballots or the correctness of the final election result. The security of our scheme is based on classical SIS/LWE assumptions, which are asymptotically as hard as worst-case lattice problems and relies on the random oracle heuristic. We also propose a new procedure to distribute the decryption task, where each trustee provides an independent proof of correct decryption in the form of a publicly verifiable ciphertext trapdoor. In particular, our protocol requires only two trustees, unlike classical proposals using threshold decryption via Shamir's secret sharing. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2016 | 10.1007/978-3-319-29360-8_16 | PQCrypto |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
E-vote, Post quantum, Fully homomorphic encryption, Lattice based protocol, LWE | Conference | 9606 |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
0302-9743 | 11 | 0.62 |
References | Authors | |
14 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Ilaria Chillotti | 1 | 92 | 5.14 |
Nicolas Gama | 2 | 412 | 24.04 |
Mariya Georgieva | 3 | 94 | 5.51 |
Malika Izabachène | 4 | 231 | 12.13 |