Abstract | ||
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An operator-assisted user-provided network (UPN) has the potential to achieve a low cost ubiquitous Internet connectivity, without significantly increasing the network infrastructure investment. In this paper, we consider such a network where the network operator encourages some of her subscribers to operate as mobile Wi-Fi hotspots (hosts), providing Internet connectivity for other subscribers (clients). We formulate the interaction between the operator and mobile users as a two-stage game. In Stage I, the operator determines the usage-based pricing and quota-based incentive mechanism for the data usage. In Stage II, the mobile users make their decisions about whether to be a host, or a client, or not a subscriber at all. We characterize how the users' membership choices will affect each other's payoffs in Stage II, and how the operator optimizes her decision in Stage I to maximize her profit. Our theoretical and numerical results show that the operator's maximum profit increases with the user density, and the profit gain can be up to 50% in a dense network comparing with a pricing-only approach with no incentives. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2015 | 10.1109/INFCOMW.2015.7179434 | 2015 IEEE CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS WORKSHOPS (INFOCOM WKSHPS) |
Field | DocType | Volume |
Mobile computing,Mobile search,Incentive,Computer security,Computer science,Public land mobile network,Computer network,Operator (computer programming),Internet access,Mobile telephony,The Internet | Journal | abs/1502.06327 |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
2159-4228 | 6 | 0.44 |
References | Authors | |
4 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Mohammad Mahdi Khalili | 1 | 21 | 5.19 |
Lin Gao | 2 | 532 | 50.89 |
Jianwei Huang | 3 | 3643 | 260.73 |
Babak Hossein Khalaj | 4 | 58 | 3.50 |