Title
Jamming in Underwater Sensor Networks as a Bayesian Zero-Sum Game with Position Uncertainty.
Abstract
We investigate a jamming problem in an underwater acoustic sensor network, where nodes try to communicate in spite of an adversary that is attempting to block their communications. We take into account that the attenuation of underwater acoustic channels is strongly dependent on the communication distance and the signal frequency. We frame the problem in a game theoretic setup, as a Bayesian zero-sum game where the sensor network acts as the maximizer of the transmission capacity, while the jammer is the minimizer. In particular, we are interested in evaluating the effect of the nodes' position on the resulting equilibrium. The Bayesian character comes into play to represent the uncertainty on the position information of the nodes. Our evaluations show that for many network configurations, the equilibrium strategy of the jammer is pure. Thus, the transmitters can act as though the jammer only causes a higher level of interference. This allows us to identify positions where the damage caused by a jammer is easier to quantify, but the jammer itself is harder to detect.
Year
DOI
Venue
2015
10.1109/GLOCOM.2015.7417412
IEEE Global Communications Conference
Keywords
Field
DocType
Underwater communication,Acoustic sensors,Wireless sensor networks,Frequency division multiaccess,Jamming,Zero-sum games,Bayesian games
Computer science,Signal-to-noise ratio,Communication channel,Real-time computing,Game theory,Zero-sum game,Interference (wave propagation),Jamming,Wireless sensor network,Bayesian probability
Conference
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
2334-0983
6
0.69
References 
Authors
5
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Valentina Vadori160.69
Maria Scalabrin282.41
Anna V. Guglielmi3113.48
Leonardo Badia438041.92