Title
Determining A Discrete Set Of Site-Constrained Privacy Options For Users In Social Networks Through Stackelberg Games
Abstract
The privacy policies of an online social network play an important role in determining user involvement and satisfaction, and in turn site profit and success. In this paper, we develop a game theoretic framework to model the relationship between the set of privacy options offered by a social network site and the sharing decisions of its users within these constraints. We model the site and the users in this scenario as the leader and followers, respectively, in a Stackelberg game. We formally establish the conditions under which this game reaches a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and provide an approximation algorithm for the site to determine a discrete set of privacy options to maximize payoff. We validate hypotheses in our model on data collected from a mock-social network of users' privacy preferences both within and outside the context of peer influence, and demonstrate that the qualitative assumptions of our model are well-founded.
Year
DOI
Venue
2015
10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_12
DECISION AND GAME THEORY FOR SECURITY, GAMESEC 2015
Field
DocType
Volume
Approximation algorithm,Peer influence,Social network,Strategy,Computer science,Privacy policy,Microeconomics,Stackelberg competition,Nash equilibrium,Stochastic game
Conference
9406
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0302-9743
0
0.34
References 
Authors
16
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Sarah Michele Rajtmajer13110.06
Christopher Griffin25811.43
Anna Cinzia Squicciarini31301106.30