Title
Approximate Solutions For Attack Graph Games With Imperfect Information
Abstract
We study the problem of network security hardening, in which a network administrator decides what security measures to use to best improve the security of the network. Specifically, we focus on deploying decoy services or hosts called honeypots. We model the problem as a general-sum extensive-form game with imperfect information and seek a solution in the form of Stackelberg Equilibrium. The defender seeks the optimal randomized honeypot deployment in a specific computer network, while the attacker chooses the best response as a contingency attack policy from a library of possible attacks compactly represented by attack graphs. Computing an exact Stackelberg Equilibrium using standard mixed-integer linear programming has a limited scalability in this game. We propose a set of approximate solution methods and analyze the trade-off between the computation time and the quality of the strategies calculated.
Year
DOI
Venue
2015
10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_13
DECISION AND GAME THEORY FOR SECURITY, GAMESEC 2015
Field
DocType
Volume
Honeypot,Best response,Network security,Markov decision process,Theoretical computer science,Network administrator,Linear programming,Stackelberg competition,Game tree,Mathematics
Conference
9406
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0302-9743
7
0.55
References 
Authors
21
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Karel Durkota1404.85
Viliam Lisý221926.66
Branislav Bosanský38614.41
Christopher Kiekintveld4117994.94