Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this paper, we investigate the interactions between a service provider (SP) and a client, where the client does not have complete information about the security conditions of the service provider. The environment includes several resources of the service provider, a client who sends requests to the service provider, and the signal generated by the service provider and delivered to the client. By taking into account potential attacks on the service provider, we develop an extended signaling game model, where the prior probability of the signaling game is determined by the outcome of a normal form game between an attacker and the service provider as a defender. Our results show different equilibria of the game as well as conditions under which these equilibria can take place. This will eventually help the defender to select the best defense mechanism against potential attacks, given his knowledge about the type of the attacker. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2015 | 10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_18 | DECISION AND GAME THEORY FOR SECURITY, GAMESEC 2015 |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Network security, Computation outsourcing, Game theory, Signaling game | Computation outsourcing,Computer security,Signaling game,Computer science,Network security,Computer network,A-normal form,Service provider,Game theory,Game client,Complete information | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
9406 | 0302-9743 | 5 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.42 | 4 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Monireh Mohebbi Moghaddam | 1 | 5 | 0.42 |
| Mohammad Hossein Manshaei | 2 | 786 | 53.69 |
| Zhu Quanyan | 3 | 1295 | 116.31 |