Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We propose investigating the design and analysis of game theoretic mechanisms when the players have very unstructured initial knowledge about themselves, but can re fine their own knowledge at a cost.We consider several set-theoretic models of "costly knowledge". Specifically, we consider auctions of a single good in which a player i's only knowledge about his own valuation, theta(i), is that it lies in a given interval [a,b]. However, the player can pay a cost, depending on a and b (in several ways), and learn a possibly arbitrary but shorter (in several metrics) sub-interval, which is guaranteed to contain theta(i).In light of the set-theoretic uncertainty they face, it is natural for the players to act so as to minimize their regret. As a first step, we analyze the performance of the secondprice mechanism in regret-minimizing strategies, and show that, in all our models, it always returns an outcome of very high social welfare. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2016 | 10.1145/2840728.2840742 | ITCS'16: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2016 ACM CONFERENCE ON INNOVATIONS IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE |
Field | DocType | Citations |
Vickrey auction,Mathematical optimization,Economics,Regret,Mechanism design,Auction theory,Common value auction,Game theory,Valuation (finance),Extensive-form game | Conference | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 9 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Atalay Mert Ileri | 1 | 12 | 2.34 |
| Silvio Micali | 2 | 11434 | 2581.31 |