Paper Info
Title
Auction Revenue In The General Spiteful-Utility Model
Abstract
It is well accepted that, in some auctions, a player's "true utility" may depend not only on the price he pays and or not he wins the good, but also on various forms of externalities, such as the prices paid by his competitors, and the identity and true value of the actual winner.In this work, we study revenue generation in single -good auctions under a very general model of externalities: the General Spiteful- Utility Model. Specifically, wePut forward new revenue benchmarks and solution concepts;Design new mechanisms when some information about the players' externalities is known; andAnalyze the revenue of the second -price mechanism when only the players have information about each other.
Year
DOI
Venue
2016
10.1145/2840728.2840741
ITCS'16: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2016 ACM CONFERENCE ON INNOVATIONS IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE
Keywords
Field
DocType
externality, spitefulness, revenue, single-good auction, undominated strategy, light Bayesian setting
Revenue,Economics,Utility model,Microeconomics,Auction theory,Revenue model,Common value auction,Externality,Industrial organization,Revenue equivalence,Competitor analysis
Conference
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
17
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Jing Chen1307.30
Silvio Micali2114342581.31