Title
Market Making With Decreasing Utility For Information
Abstract
We study information elicitation in cost-function-based combinatorial prediction markets when the market maker's utility for information decreases over time. In the sudden revelation setting, it is known that some piece of information will be revealed to traders, and the market maker wishes to prevent guaranteed profits for trading on the sure information. In the gradualdecrease setting, the market maker's utility for (partial) information decreases continuously over time. We design adaptive cost functions for both settings which: (1) preserve the information previously gathered in the market; (2) eliminate (or diminish) rewards to traders for the publicly revealed information; (3) leave the reward structure unaffected for other information; and (4) maintain the market maker's worst-case loss. Our constructions utilize mixed Bregman divergence, which matches our notion of utility for information.
Year
Venue
Field
2014
UNCERTAINTY IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Mathematical economics,Economics,Actuarial science,Microeconomics,Market maker,Bregman divergence,Information elicitation,Profit (economics)
DocType
Volume
ISSN
Journal
abs/1407.8161
M. Dudik, R. Frongillo, and J. Wortman Vaughan. Market Making with Decreasing Utility for Information. In Proceedings of the 30th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, pages 152-161, 2014
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
1
0.37
18
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Miroslav Dudík157351.52
Rafael M. Frongillo214122.64
Jennifer Wortman Vaughan392942.23