Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Sanitizable signature schemes $$\\mathcal {SSS}$$SSS enable a designated party called the sanitizer to alter admissible blocks of a signed message. This primitive can be used to remove or alter sensitive data from already signed messages without involvement of the original signer. Current state-of-the-art security definitions of $$\\mathcal {SSS}$$SSSs only define a \"weak\" form of security. Namely, the unforgeability, accountability and transparency definitions are not strong enough to be meaningful in certain use-cases. We identify some of these use-cases, close this gap by introducing stronger definitions, and show how to alter an existing construction to meet our desired security level. Moreover, we clarify a small yet important detail in the state-of-the-art privacy definition. Our work allows to deploy this primitive in more and different scenarios. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2018 | 10.1007/978-3-319-29883-2_7 | DPM/QASA@ESORICS |
DocType | Volume | ISSN |
Journal | 2018 | 0302-9743 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
6 | 0.40 | 23 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stephan Krenn | 1 | 378 | 21.46 |
| Samelin, K. | 2 | 148 | 12.46 |
| Dieter Sommer | 3 | 158 | 9.79 |