Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
LEX is a stream cipher that progressed to Phase 3 of the eSTREAM stream cipher project. In this paper, we show that the security of LEX against algebraic attacks relies on a small equation system not being solvable faster than exhaustive search. We use the byte leakage in LEX to construct a system of 21 equa- tions in 17 variables. This is very close to the require- ment for an efficient attack, i.e. a system containing 16 variables. The system requires only 36 bytes of keystream, which is very low. |
Year | Venue | Keywords |
|---|---|---|
2009 | Artificial Intelligence and Symbolic Computation | advanced encryption standard,lex,stream cipher.,stream cipher |
Field | DocType | Citations |
Keystream,Advanced Encryption Standard,Computer science,Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir attack,Algorithm,Theoretical computer science,Running key cipher,Algebraic analysis,Stream cipher,eSTREAM,Stream cipher attack | Conference | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 7 | 6 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Muhammad Reza Z'aba | 1 | 31 | 6.62 |
| Håvard Raddum | 2 | 147 | 18.95 |
| Leonie Ruth Simpson | 3 | 58 | 17.65 |
| Ed Dawson | 4 | 1128 | 129.01 |
| Matt Henricksen | 5 | 131 | 13.55 |
| Kenneth Koon-Ho Wong | 6 | 0 | 0.34 |