Paper Info
Title
Spectrum auctions in the secondary market with multiple bids
Abstract
In this paper, we propose an auction where the primary users (i.e., spectrum licence holders) sell spectrum to secondary users (i.e., non-licence holders) in a dynamic spectrum access networks. We consider a market like scenario where chunks of spectrum is traded where buyers put forward multiple bids based on how much spectrum they need and what is the price they are willing to pay. We use the Sigmoid function to model the price function that the buyers use. On the other hand, the sellers choose the buyers in such a way that maximizes their revenue. We find the set of the winning bids by solving the 0-1 knapsack problem using dynamic programming. Though simulation experiments, we show how the proposed auction performs with respect to selecting the bids and the total revenue generated <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">1</sup> .
Year
DOI
Venue
2015
10.1109/ICACCI.2015.7275579
2015 International Conference on Advances in Computing, Communications and Informatics (ICACCI)
Keywords
Field
DocType
Dynamic spectrum access networks,Auctions,Primary users,Secondary users,Simulations
Secondary market,Resource management,Revenue,Dynamic programming,Computer science,Microeconomics,Control engineering,Knapsack problem,Total revenue,Spectrum auction,Mobile telephony
Conference
ISBN
Citations 
PageRank 
978-1-4799-8790-0
0
0.34
References 
Authors
11
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Shobbana Santhoshini J. R.100.34
Mainak Chatterjee21562175.84