Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We study interdependent value settings and extend several results from the well-studied independent private values model to these settings. For revenue-optimal mechanism design, we give conditions under which Myerson's virtual value-based mechanism remains optimal with interdependent values. One of these conditions is robustness of the truthfulness and individual rationality guarantees, in the sense that they are required to hold ex-post. We then consider an even more robust class of mechanisms called “prior independent” (“detail free”), and show that, by simply using one of the bidders to set a reserve price, it is possible to extract near-optimal revenue in an interdependent values setting. This shows that a considerable level of robustness is achievable for interdependent values in single-parameter environments.
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Year | Venue | Keywords |
|---|---|---|
2016 | ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. | Interdependence, Myerson theory, correlated values, optimal auctions, prior independence |
Field | DocType | Volume |
Revenue,Interdependence,Rationality,Reservation price,Computer science,Microeconomics,Robustness (computer science),Mechanism design | Journal | 4 |
Issue | Citations | PageRank |
3 | 1 | 0.37 |
References | Authors | |
13 | 2 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tim Roughgarden | 1 | 4177 | 353.32 |
| Inbal Talgam-Cohen | 2 | 85 | 18.51 |